I. INTRODUCTION
A new age in civil litigation has dawned for American trial courts of general jurisdiction. The traditional role involving neutral, detached, and passive judges, who look to adversaries in private-party civil actions to prepare cases for later courtroom trials on pleaded claims, has given way to proactive judges who direct disputes toward resolution, increasingly through court-mandated hearings beyond their own courtrooms and judicially managed settlements. As a result, new written guidelines have appeared for federal and state trial judges who now more frequently oversee extrajudicial (but court-sponsored) settlement discussions, who preside over judicial settlement conferences, and who help facilitate private settlement talks. Today, written laws on trial increasingly coexist with written laws on settlement. New written norms on extrajudicial hearings have emerged that address court-compelled and court-assisted mediations and arbitrations, as well as on aspects of judicial settlement conferences including compelled participation, contract formation, and KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 contract enforcement. Some new guidelines have also emerged on the judicial oversight of aspects of wholly private settlement talks, including insurance adjuster conduct and settlement enforcement. These new guidelines on civil case settlements have arisen in civil procedure rules, professional responsibility standards (for attorneys and for judges), and occasionally in substantive statutory laws. In the absence of written norms, inherent judicial-power principles sometimes are employed. However, the elusive nature of inherent power has caused much confusion, leading to doubt and unevenness where certainty and uniformity are desired and achievable. Inherent power is less necessary, of course, where written laws operate. And certainly, uniformity and certainty are promoted by explicit written laws. The new civil litigation age has not, however, ushered in adequate new written laws on judicial settlement conferences. Civil litigation laws anticipating trials between named parties on pleaded claims continue to dominate, though proactive trial judges increasingly facilitate settlements involving nonparties and unpleaded claims. So, contemporary laws now reflect more "legend" and less "reality." 3 Similarly, though to a lesser extent than for settlement, today there are inadequate written norms for trial court review of private arbitrations and agency adjudications. For the former, there are vexing issues on the lines dividing trial judge and arbitrator responsibilities. For the latter, there are challenging issues on the level of judicial deference to agency interpretation of statutes the agency administers, as well as on the scope of judicial review of agency factfinding.
There is today a need for additional written guidelines on alternative nonevidentiary and evidentiary hearings designed to prompt settlements as well as on judicial and private settlement conferences. Similarly, there is a need for new guidelines on trial court review of private arbitrations and administrative agency adjudications. 4 The adoption of such standards would be greatly facilitated if the American Bar Association (ABA) were to revise the general description of the trial judge's role in civil litigation, set forth in materials such as the Model Code of Judicial Conduct and the Standards Relating to Trial Courts. 
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The descriptions of American trial judges and courts, and the lawyers and others working with them, too often exclude significant avenues of civil case resolution and significant review responsibilities of trial court judges. If general visions of American trial courts are limited, written laws on these same trial courts might address only those matters envisioned rather than all matters of import. New written guidelines on civil case settlement and court review of private arbitrations and agency adjudications would be easier to implement if, for example, current efforts to rewrite the Model Code of Judicial Conduct encompassed a broader and more accurate vision of trial court responsibilities. The traditional role of general jurisdiction trial courts in civil litigation will first be explored. In particular, the articulated visions of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct and the Standards Relating to Trial Courts, as well as the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), will be examined. Next, the new trial court role will be described, where there is an expectation of fewer trials, more judicially managed settlements, and more appellate review of civil claim resolutions initially made elsewhere. Finally, some possible new guidelines on civil case settlement and on trial court review responsibilities will be posited, following an illustration of the unfortunate consequences that flow from a lack of general and particular codified norms.
II. THE VISIONS OF GENERAL JURISDICTION TRIAL COURTS IN CIVIL LITIGATION
In exploring the challenges facing trial judges in the vastly expanding arena of public-law litigation, Professor Abram Chayes nicely described the judicial role in "our traditional conception" of private-law litigation. 5 Customarily, on the civil side, "a lawsuit is a vehicle for settling disputes between private parties about private rights." 6 The defining features of traditional civil litigation of private disputes are:
1. "The lawsuit is bipolar," involving a contest between two adverse parties "diametrically opposed" wherein any decision would be "on a winner-takes-all basis."
5. The civil-litigation process employed to resolve a private dispute is "party-initiated and party-controlled" so that the trial judge is "a neutral arbiter of [party] interactions who decides questions of law only if they are put in issue."
11
This perspective continues to dominate many judicial-conduct and trial-court standards guiding civil cases. 12 ABA pronouncements, as well as the most significant written civil procedure norms, the FRCP, are chiefly guided by this "traditional conception" of private litigation wherein "private parties" and their "private rights" are at issue.
To govern judicial conduct, the ABA initially adopted the Canons of Judicial Ethics on July 9, 1924 ("1924 Canons"). 13 The Canons were superseded by the Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted by the ABA in 1972 ("1972 Code") 14 and revised and adopted in the 1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct ("1990 Code"). 15 The later Code more closely followed the traditional judicial role envisioned by Professor Chayes. 
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The 1924 Canons declared "ethical standards" in the hope they would "become habits of life" for judges. 16 However, these canons simply described appropriate judicial behavior in broad terms without detailing the range of judicial duties. Thus, Canon 5, on essential conduct, declared a judge should be "temperate, attentive, patient, impartial and . . . studious of the principles of the law and diligent in endeavoring to ascertain the facts."
17 Canon 19, on judicial opinions, stated a trial judge "should indicate reasons" when "disposing of controverted cases," thereby showing no serious arguments of counsel were "disregarded or overlooked"; demonstrating the judge's "full understanding"; promoting "confidence"; and avoiding any "suspicion of arbitrary conclusion."
18 Additionally, Canon 34, summarizing judicial obligation, noted that a judge should be "above reproach" as well as "conscientious, studious, thorough, courteous, patient, punctual, just, impartial, fearless of public clamor . . . and indifferent to private political or partisan influences."
19
The 1924 Canons were superseded on August 16, 1972 when the ABA adopted the Code of Judicial Conduct. 20 Unlike the 1924 Canons, the 1972 Code spoke to a range of judicial duties. Canon 3, on the impartial and diligent performance of the duties of a judicial office, set forth "standards."
21
These standards were divided into categories of judicial duties, including adjudicative responsibilities; administrative responsibilities (involving, in part, the direction of staff and court officials); disqualification (involving grounds for questioning judicial impartiality); and remittal of disqualification (involving waivers of certain bases for judicial disqualification).
22
Within the section on adjudicative responsibilities, the 1972 standards, at times, were sufficiently broad to cover judicial conduct on and off the record and to encompass decision making responsibilities that extended beyond pleaded claims and named parties. Thus, one standard stated a judge "should maintain order and decorum in proceedings." 23 Another required a judge to be "patient, dignified, and courteous" to litigants, lawyers, and "others with whom" the judge "deals" in an 16 26 The specific judicial duties in 1990 were said to include adjudicative responsibilities, administrative responsibilities, disciplinary responsibilities, and disqualification. 27 Many of the standards from the 1972 Code remained.
The 1990 Code continued to speak of "proceedings" before the judge, 28 responsibilities to "others" beyond litigants, jurors, witnesses, and lawyers, 29 and "the right to be heard" for "every person" who has a legal interest in a proceeding. 30 Unfortunately, however, many of the 1972 standards were replaced in 1990 by standards that did not address trial court duties beyond pleaded claims and named parties. For example, while the 1972 Code declared a judge "should dispose promptly of the business of the court," 31 the 1990 Code said a judge "shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently, and fairly."
32
The accompanying 1972 Code commentary spoke of punctuality "in attending court" and expedition "in determining matters under submission."
33
The relevant 1990 Code commentary not only repeated those admonitions, but also spoke of extending "due regard for the rights of parties," of monitoring and supervising "cases," and of facilitating settlements by "parties."
34 These additional directives describe judicial duties more narrowly, limiting them to "cases," a term of art that often does not embody all of the disputes within a civil lawsuit, and to "parties," another term of art that typically excludes many who have disputed legal interests that are 24 38 and authorized separate conferencing, "with the consent of the parties," involving a judge, one party, and that party's lawyer "in an effort to mediate or settle matters pending before the judge."
39 Thus, in 1990, there was no recognition of barriers to ex parte conferencing with nonparties who were legally interested in pending civil proceedings (as a result of liens, insurance contracts, or subrogation interests).
As the 1924 Canons evolved into a 1972 Code, and later into the 1990 Code, the judicial role was more particularly and narrowly defined, with an increasing view of adjudicative responsibilities as involving cases and parties rather than pending matters and persons legally interested. The view of the judicial role within the 1990 Code is consistent with Professor Chayes's view of "traditional" civil litigation.
40
Currently there is discussion about revising the 1990 Code. 41 But to date there has been little movement away from the perspective that judicial conduct in civil cases involves only "traditional" duties. Under a December 2005 draft, Canon 2 would encompass guidelines on judicial conduct involving the impartial and diligent performance of the duties of a judicial office.
42
The proposed Canon 2 has guidelines in various 35 . Id. An example with an approach similar to the 1972 Code is Canon 3 of the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct, which speaks of a "full right to be heard" for "every person who is legally interested in a proceeding." PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(a)(4) (2002 Within the section on adjudication, the proposed standards of 2005 continue to describe-broadly at times-judicial conduct in civil cases. The standards speak of a duty to "hear and decide matters assigned,"
45 to "decide all cases with impartiality and fairness" 46 (though the accompanying comment states that this duty goes "to all parties" 47 ), to perform diligently all judicial duties, "disposing of all judicial matters promptly and efficiently," 48 and to "accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding . . . the right to be heard according to law" 49 (though the accompanying comment on judicial oversight of settlements states that this duty embodies protecting "a party's right to be heard" and repeatedly refers to settlements involving "parties" 50 ). Elsewhere the 2005 proposed standards on adjudication speak more narrowly of the interests of "parties," as in the sections on ex parte communications and disqualification. Thus, one proposed standard declares: "A judge may, with the consent of the parties, confer separately with the parties and their lawyers in an effort to settle matters pending before the judge." Judicial Conduct continue to focus on "parties" rather than on persons with legal interests and on the pleaded claims rather than on all "matters" in dispute.
The traditional perspective on the role of the trial judge, as described by Professor Chayes, continues in other ABA pronouncements. For 55 Within the latter, trial courts were admonished to give "due recognition" both to the "jurisdiction of administrative and quasi-judicial boards and agencies" (requiring "appropriate deference") 56 and to "the role of arbitration in the resolution of legal controversies," involving active encouragement of "voluntary reference to arbitration." 57 Here, trial courts either provided "a forum for review" or "enforcement" 58 responsibilities that were distinguished from civil case processing. Within section 2.02, on Procedure in Civil Cases, the 1976 Trial Court Standards required " [p] leadings" that reasonably informed "parties" of "claims and defenses," 59 liberal laws on "joinder of claims and parties," 60 and summary treatment of "insufficient" claims and defenses. 61 The accompanying commentary urged that there be "[p]rocess rules" making it "possible for all appropriate parties to be joined." 62 By February 1992, the Trial Court Standards had been altered significantly.
63
Section 2.00 included discussions of "Supervisory Functions" and, to replace "Other Dispute-Resolving Procedures," discussions of both "Administrative Tribunals," where "appropriate deference" was still required, and "Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs."
64
The latter covered "court-annexed or court-referred" arbitrations as well as mediations and conciliations before nonjudges. 65 Yet, this part of section 2.00 was limited in application. It referenced only the procedural opportunities for "the parties." 66 As with ABA pronouncements, the FRCP, from their implementation in the late 1930s, have also chiefly reflected the vision described by Professor Chayes. Since many states have substantially modeled their written civil procedure laws on the FRCP, the account by Professor Chayes is largely compatible with existing state court rules and statutes on civil case processes. 69 Under the contemporary FRCP, the adversaries are parties, often represented by lawyers, 70 who present, or defend against, a "claim for relief"; 71 who undertake the various methods of formal "discovery"; 72 who make or oppose a "motion" related to a pending claim; 73 and who undertake pretrial, trial, and post-trial efforts aimed at "claim" resolution. 74 Further, jurors may only render a "special verdict" on issues "which might properly be made under the pleadings."
75
A judgment in a case involving "multiple claims" or "multiple parties" may be limited to the resolution of only a single "claim," whether presented in a "claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim." 76 Further, an offer of judgment often may only be made by "a party defending against a claim."
77 So, like ABA principles, the FRCP and state civil procedure laws speak mostly to parties with their claims, rather than to the broader group of persons who are "legally interested" or to the broader range of disputes that are possibly subject to resolution with judicial assistance.
The United States Judicial Code, embodying congressional directives that structure and guide the Article III judiciary of the federal government, similarly speaks to parties and their claims rather than to all persons with legal interests in dispute resolution. For example, claims the rights of the parties," and noting the "opportunity for the parties to choose an ADR professional"). are at the core of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, a law that describes only some of the federal courts' adjudicatory authority over disputes that are factually related to pending diversity or federal question claims.
78
Pendent and ancillary adjudicatory authority under federal precedents are broader than the statutory supplemental authority as they may not involve the named parties at all. Additionally, the convenience of the parties, rather than of all those who are legally interested, is at the core of the change of venue statute. However, there is a reference to considerations of what "justice" demands.
79
The Chayes/ABA/FRCP vision of trial court adjudicatory authority, emphasizing named parties and their claims rather than all those who are legally interested in the event(s) prompting the presentation of those claims, dominates the teaching of civil procedure in American law schools, usually in the first year. For example, Professor Yeazell's very popular civil procedure book begins with "a simple and plausible fact situation" involving a college student from Michigan who, while visiting his parents in Illinois, gets into a car accident with a lifelong Illinois resident. 80 The fact pattern is developed in the first chapter to introduce subjects such as jurisdiction, 81 89 Insurance is only mentioned in an illustrative case, where an insurer files a lawsuit seeking to recover what it paid to its insured for the damage caused by the defendant. 90 There is no talk of insurers as lienholders, of insurers as nonparties who are nevertheless on the hook for judgments against their insureds, or of insurance policy coverage issues. There is no talk of other lienholders, likely including the plaintiff's very own attorney. Early on in Professors Friedenthal, Miller, Sexton, and Hershkoff's civil 78. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000) (speaking to jurisdiction over "all other claims"); id. § 1367(c) (guiding a district court on its discretion to decline jurisdiction "over a claim").
79 ABA standards and federal and state contemporary civil procedure laws continue to speak only to parties, rather than to the broader array of legally interested persons, and to claims, rather than to all "matters" that may be resolved in private civil cases. Yet trial courts increasingly face far fewer trials in certain types of private disputes; help resolve more claims than those pleaded; initiate more settlement talks that occur beyond court-directed outside arbitrations, mediations, or conciliations; and hear more appeals. Unfortunately, these trial court responsibilities remain substantially unrecognized or unguided in the ABA standards or in written American civil procedure laws.
A. Fewer Trials
There are fewer trials for certain private civil claims today, such as consumer and civil rights in employment, because of the expansive readings of the Federal Arbitration Act 92 by the Supreme Court of the United States, 93 as well as the related explosion in the numbers of compulsory and binding arbitration contracts covering future civil disputes. 94 The FAA generally declares that "a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. Dobson, 96 in 1995, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the Act, grounded on Commerce Clause powers, preempts state antiarbitration laws and applies in state courts. 97 The Court also broadened the Act so as to cover not only contracts contemplating substantial interstate activity, but also contracts that, in fact, only turned out to involve some interstate commerce. 98 The Act exempts "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 99 However, in 2001 the Supreme Court, in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 100 limited the exemption to contracts of employees whose work clearly contemplated interstate commerce, such as transportation workers.
101 Thus, the Act applies to employees whose actual work involves some degree of interstate commerce.
102
As a result of these and other Supreme Court decisions, there has been an explosion in the number of enforceable contracts mandating arbitration of future civil claims. There is no indication that this escalation will end anytime soon. If anything, it seems the biggest bangs are yet to be heard. These contractual arbitrations occur outside of American trial courts, precluding traditional trials. Thus, for many disputes arising out of consumer purchases 103 106 written civil procedure laws chiefly premised on a "jurybased legal culture" are grounded on "legend" rather than on the "reality" of contemporary civil litigation.
107

B. More than Pleaded Claims
There is also increasing trial court authority over legal issues, including claims, that are factually related to pending private civil actions, but that do not involve any of the expressly named parties. For example, in civil litigation today, two insurers of two opposing parties may be at odds and may be the real adversaries. Furthermore, a plaintiff's attorney, via a contingency fee agreement, or a plaintiff's creditor, via a lien, are more likely to assert a property interest in the proceeds of any monetary recovery by the plaintiff than they were fifty years ago. 106. See Murray, supra note 3, at 58-59 (suggesting, inter alia, increased use of summary judgment and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, as well as the expense and unpredictability of jury verdicts).
107. Professor Murray observes: Most of the members of the current generation of mature American lawyers and judges received their legal education . . . in a culture in which the jury trial was at the core . . . . Fifty or more years ago, this jury-based legal culture had some real connection with reality. A fair proportion of the lawyers and many of the judges were actually involved in civil jury trials on a regular basis. . . .
The current statistics make it clear that by comparison with previous generations, lawyers and judges of today are living [in] a legal culture in which trial by jury is more a legend than a reality . . . . The trend . . . strongly suggests that the role of the civil jury trial in our legal culture today is based on a past, rather than a present, reality. The aforementioned general statute on supplemental jurisdiction only partially addresses federal subject matter jurisdiction over factually interdependent nonparty claims.
111 It seemingly permits jurisdiction both over claims between parties and over nonparty claims, as it authorizes "supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims" already presented under diversity or federal question original jurisdiction "that they form part of the same case or controversy."
112 The federal statute does not expressly demand that all supplemental claims that were heard or otherwise resolved could have been joined, pleaded, or otherwise formally presented. 113 Little else is said of nonparties in the supplemental jurisdiction statute. For example, it does not recognize Supreme Court precedent indicating that the ancillary adjudicatory authority, always discretionary in nature, operates differently for related nonparty claims than for related claims between parties. 114 The Court has said that ancillary authority over factually interdependent claims is less available when the claims involve "parties not named in any claim that is independently cognizable by the federal court," as such claims are "fundamentally different" than claims involving named parties. 115 Beyond the necessary relatedness, the Court has also said that federal adjudicatory authority over nonparty claims requires "an examination of the posture" in which the claims were asserted and the "specific statute that confers [original] CT. R. 5.125(C)(6) (stating that in a proceeding for an examination of an account of a fiduciary, notice must be given to "interested persons," who include "insurers and sureties who might be subject to financial obligations as the result of the approval of the account").
120. 
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between the plaintiffs and defendants" 123 (e.g., disputes regarding insurance coverage).
C. More Judicially Managed Settlements
In American trial courts today, there are also more judicially managed settlement talks involving private civil disputes. Consider the evolution of FRCP 16 since its appearance in 1938. 124 As with other FRCP, this federal rule is followed in many states. 125 Initially, FRCP 16 was entitled "Pre-Trial Procedure; Formulating Issues."
126 It made no explicit mention of settlement; rather, it addressed trial preparation conferences regarding simplifying issues, amending pleadings, avoiding unnecessary proof, limiting experts, and referring to factual issue matters.
127
FRCP 16 was considerably amended in 1983. 128 The title changed to "Pretrial Conferences; Scheduling; Management."
129 It required early scheduling and planning conferences for many civil cases and anticipated multiple conferences before trial. 130 It broadened judicial authority to reach unrepresented parties as well as attorneys.
131
"Facilitating the settlement of the case" became a valid objective of pretrial conferences. 132 The new rule suggested "the possibility of settlement" as a subject for discussion at pretrial conferences. 133 It did not list possible participants in conferences. 134 However, it stated that "at least one of the attorneys for each party participating in any conference before trial shall The Advisory Committee noted that FRCP 16 was a success partly due to improvement and expansion of the settlement process. 137 It stated that pretrial conferences for the sole purpose of settlement could be desirable and that "settlement should be facilitated at as early a stage of the litigation as possible." 138 However, it noted that a mandatory settlement conference "would be a waste of time in many cases."
139
The most recent amendment to FRCP 16 occurred in 1993. 140 The 1993 changes merely refined the previous rule.
141 It suggests judges be more active in the pretrial conferences.
142
As opposed to the 1983 version offering "the possibility of settlement" as a possible subject for pretrial conference, the 1993 version advises the court may "take appropriate actions" regarding settlement.
143
Under the 1993 Rule, judges may "require that a party or its representative be present or reasonably available by telephone in order to consider possible settlement of the dispute." 
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state acts that require trial courts perform the appellate, or quasiappellate, process of confirmation, allowing the courts to then enforce arbitration awards. The expanding use of administrative tribunals to resolve private civil claims in the first instance has been legislatively mandated. However, the delegation doctrine limits legislators. It requires certain core governmental responsibilities be left to only one of the three governmental branches set out constitutionally. 145 This means that there may be some essential judicial functions regarding civil case resolutions. 146 The jury trial right also limits legislators. 147 It demands that only incidental private interests be adjudicated administratively when reasonably necessary to effectuate an administrative agency's primary regulatory purpose. 148 Otherwise, American legislators ordinarily have leeway in directing certain private claims to agencies, albeit with later appellate-type court review. Constitutionally, many state trial courts are simply recognized as having the authority to exercise whatever appellate jurisdiction may be provided by law. In Florida, the constitution is more explicit, declaring that the circuit courts "shall have the power of direct review of administrative action prescribed by general law." 146. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 386 (recognizing certain governmental functions may be "exclusively committed" to one branch of government); McHugh, 777 P.2d at 108 (courts must vigilantly apply the "principle of check" in order to preserve for the courts the "true" judicial power). In the civil case arena, a core judicial function is often described as involving the resolution of contested facts in a private civil dispute that leads to "an award of unliquidated common law damages for personal injuries. Besides agency decisions, American trial courts undertake more appellate-type proceedings today as they review and confirm the increasing numbers of arbitration awards under the FAA 152 and related state arbitration acts. The FAA and similar state acts expressly recognize a reviewing role for trial courts regarding arbitration awards arising from disputes governed by compulsory and binding arbitration pacts. The federal act states that federal district courts should normally confirm such arbitration awards. There is some wiggle room, though far less than with traditional appellate court review of trial court decisions where there are usually de novo (legal questions), clearly erroneous (factual questions), and abuse of discretion standards of review. The FAA only allows a trial court to vacate, modify, or correct an arbitration award for very limited reasons, such as "corruption, fraud, or undue means" in the procurement of the award; "evident partiality or corruption" in any arbitrator; or "an evident material mistake."
153 Beyond these grounds, arbitration awards will be confirmed unless they direct parties to violate the law. 
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confusion and widely differing approaches to common legal issues, even within a single multijudge court. The confusion over judicial settlement conferences, settlement talks personally presided over by trial court judges, is illustrative. The divergent judicial approaches, prompted by underinclusively written laws with little legislative history, demonstrate the dangers of written rules and statutes that expressly reflect, at best, only Professor Chayes's vision of trial court work.
157
The confusion over the calls for increased judicial settlement conferencing is exemplified in one federal appellate court ruling addressing whether district judges can compel the attendance of nonparties, such as insurers.
158
The ruling has significant practical import as nonparties often hold the keys to amicable and complete civil case resolutions. This confusion would be more easily mitigated upon revision of civil trial courts. With a new perspective, new guidelines on judicial settlement conferences could be more readily implemented. Civil settlements are an arena of great entrepreneurial creativity, welcomed by the rules and actively encouraged from the bench. Encouragement, in fact, is typically the judge's sole role in civil settlement. The rules have nothing to say about the content of civil settlements, and neither, in the vast majority of cases, does the judge presiding over the litigation. The terms of a civil settlement need bear no relation to the outcome dictated by substantive law. Nor need they bear any resemblance to the settlement of a nearly identical case being handled in the courtroom next door. The dark side of unconstrained creativity is arbitrary lawlessness. 158. There are significant differences among trial court judges on other judicial settlement conferencing issues. See, e.g., Galanter & Cahill, supra note 1, at 1342-43 (discussing a 1980 nationwide survey of federal and state trial judges showing that 68% intervened "subtly" in judicial settlement conferences, 10% intervened "aggressively," and 22% were "noninterventionist"). Another survey showed that 41% of federal judges and 56% of state judges reported they had "suggested settlement terms," though far fewer judges were interventionist in bench trials than in jury trials. Id. at 1343.
A. Narrow Vision, Resulting Confusion
159. 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc). This is not an isolated incident of widely divergent views on trial court authority to compel a nonparty's attendance at a settlement, or settlementfacilitating, proceedings, be it before the trial judge or another (e.g., mediator, arbitrator, conciliator). Similar views are shown in the notes as the Heileman opinions are described.
160. Id. at 652-53. On occasion, courts do not explore the language of the pertinent pretrial conference rule and simply recognize compulsory powers over interested nonparties. See, e.g., In re LaMarre, 494 F.2d 753, 756 (6th Cir. 1974) (finding that court had power to compel an insurance company's appearance because it was liable for any damages owed by the defendant). KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 judge had ordered a defendant's "corporate representative with authority to settle" to attend a pretrial settlement conference.
161
The only defendant's representative who appeared was its attorney. 162 The trial court determined the order was violated and imposed sanctions under FRCP 16(f). 163 The defendant argued on appeal, to no avail, that the contemporary version of FRCP 16 permitted the trial court to order the attendance of "attorneys for the parties or any unrepresented parties." 164 Writing for the majority, Judge Kanne found that FRCP 16 did not "completely describe and limit the power of the federal courts," though the "concept that district courts exercise procedural authority outside the explicit language of the rules of civil procedure is not frequently documented." 165 He reasoned that "the mere absence of language in the federal rules . . . should not, and does not, give rise to a negative implication of prohibition."
166 Written civil procedure laws only "form and shape certain aspects of a court's inherent powers," he said, and do not bar the continued exercise of those powers "where discretion should be available." 167 Judge Kanne concluded that FRCP 16 did not restrict district judges in the conduct of pretrial conferences, as written laws do not limit, but in fact are "enhanced by," inherent judicial power. 168 While Judge Kanne found that inherent judicial power enhanced FRCP 16, the dissenters in Heileman found the use of such power inappropriate, at least in the pending case. 169 Some dissenters found that any inherent power should not encompass mandated attendance by a represented party, its agent, or any others not mentioned in the rule.
170
In dissent, Judge Posner explained that under the written federal rule, the "main purpose of the pretrial conference is to get ready for trial." 171 Accordingly, a represented party's presence at a pretrial conference would only be needed to facilitate settlement. 
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power to promote settlement.
173
One danger involved encouraging "judicial high-handedness" because of the idea that "power corrupts." 174 Also, because people hire attorneys to "economize on their own investment of time in resolving disputes," there was a danger in overriding their judgment. 175 However, Judge Posner also recognized that because "necessity breaks iron," inherent authority is "a potentially useful tool for effecting settlement, even if there is some difficulty in finding a legal basis."
176 He recognized that trial judges face "heavy" workloads and was hesitant "to infer inadvertent prohibitions" by federal rulemakers of the powers that are necessary for the trial judges to function successfully. 177 He did not further explore the contours of FRCP 16 as he found that, whatever it-or any inherent powerpermitted, the order against Joseph Oat was impermissible because Oat had made it clear that it would not agree to pay any money.
178
In his dissent, Judge Coffey was even more cautious about inherent power. He was "convinced that Rule 16 does not authorize a trial judge to require a represented party litigant to attend a pretrial conference together with his or her attorney because the rule mandates in clear and unambiguous terms that only an unrepresented party litigant and attorneys may be ordered to appear."
179 While Judge Coffey agreed that judges do possess some degree of inherent authority, he believed "this authority is limited," suggesting that more expansive trial court powers should be granted through federal judicial rulemaking. 180 He outlined a "host of problems" that accompany an overly broad inherent power doctrine, including "a substantial invitation for judicial abuse" as well as the prospect of undermining the appearance of impartiality and causing 173. Id. 174. Id.; see also In re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154, 157-58 (6th Cir. 1993) (using this rationale to overturn a trial court order mandating participation in a summary jury trial, noting that the FRCP did not expressly permit it and proposals to expand trial court compulsory powers involving summary trials had been expressly rejected).
175. See Heileman, 871 F.3d at 657 (Posner, J., dissenting) (stating judges may "ignore the value of other people's time" in their zeal to settle cases). Judge Ripple, in dissent, found "that the most enduring-and dangerous-impact" of the majority opinion was to upset the relationship between Congress and the Judiciary.
183
Because the Rules Enabling Act 184 was "designed to foster a uniform system of procedure throughout the federal system," he said the Act "hardly contemplates" a broad, amorphous definition of inherent power. 185 He concluded that "Congressional concern for uniformity of practice in the federal courts" would be undermined as each individual court might "march to its own drummer."
186
In dissent, Judge Manion lamented "judicial high-handedness," additional expense to litigants, and no "appearance of fairness."
187 He opined that inherent power cannot be "a license for federal courts to do whatever seems necessary to move a case along."
188 Rather, it should only be employed "to fill gaps left by statute or rule." 189 Thus, "where a statue or rule specifically addresses a particular area, it is inappropriate to invoke inherent power to exceed the bounds the statute or rule sets."
190
The Heileman opinions show how written civil procedure guidelines reflecting a narrow vision of civil trial courts can result in confusion and disparity where certainty and equality are desirable. 191 Imagine how the 181. Id. at 661-62. Recognizing such potential problems, another appellate court determined that some such exercises of inherent power (in that case, to order compulsory nonbinding mediation) should be accompanied "in advance" by judicially dictated "reasonable" limits (e.g., time and expense). In re Atlantic Pipe Corp., 304 F. 191. Certainly, broader guidelines expressly covering all who are "legally interested" could arise under local court rules. See, e.g., Mulligan v. Piczon, 739 A.2d 605, 610 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) (relying on a local court rule which says "the party or a person with full settlement authority shall accompany the attorney to the pretrial conference" (emphasis omitted)). However, uniform local opinion would have read if the court had not only compelled the attendance of the defendant's insurer, but also of the plaintiff's insurer. A situation like this would occur if the plaintiff's insurer had compensated the plaintiff for injuries caused by the defendant and had a lien to recover such payments.
192
B. A New Vision in a New Model Judicial Code
Judicial settlement guidelines should allow participation of all who are "legally interested," as contemplated in the 1972 Code.
193 These guidelines should also recognize that settlements may encompass matters factually related to the pending claims, even where only the pleaded claims may be tried on the merits. Professor Chayes did not articulate this vision. The 1924 Canons more clearly suggested the appropriateness of such guidelines than did the 1990 Code, with its commentary. There are ways to remodel the traditional vision of trial court conduct. A new vision should include not only all those with legal interests, but also all disputes that might become "matters under submission" under the 1972 Code.
194
One way to a new vision of trial courts is through the inevitable state-by-state deliberations on the new ABA initiative regarding the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. The study commission specifically invited comments in a few areas, including "what role judges should play in encouraging parties to settle" civil cases. 195 Unfortunately, the rules are rare so that at least some uncertainty and disparity will continue even should local rules proliferate. Local court rulemaking on federal district court authority to compel nonbinding forms of alternative dispute resolution, as well as the split in federal case precedents on such judicial authority, are discussed in Amy M. 197 While the rules and comments at times speak to "matters assigned," 198 any person "who has a legal interest," 199 and "participants" 200 in judicial proceedings, within the section on adjudication they focus more on the "rights of litigants,"
201 ensuring the rights of the parties to be heard, 202 the settlements of "parties," 203 how parties should not be coerced into settlement, 204 ex parte communication barriers and procedures involving "parties," 205 separate conferencing "with the parties and their lawyers in an effort to settle matters pending," 206 "personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer," 207 a judge's "economic interest . . . in a party to the proceeding," 208 campaign contributions by "a party" or "a party's lawyer," 209 and a procedure whereby "parties" waive their concerns regarding judicial disqualifications. descriptions of private civil case resolutions by academicians like Professor Chayes, and similar visions of American trial courts were all broadened to encompass those with legal interests and all matters that might be resolved amicably, if not tried, in civil cases, then it is more likely that written civil procedures laws, such as FRCP 16, would more comprehensively speak to civil case practices and would be a "more accurate reflection of actual practice."
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Altering traditional perspectives would not be difficult. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct could speak to civil case responsibilities generally in a section on civil case resolution rather than in sections on adjudication and administration. Within this new section, at least three avenues of civil case resolution should be recognized: de novo, appellate review, and arbitration confirmation. Within the de novo category, criminal cases and civil cases would be separated. For civil cases subject to a de novo look, the major dispute resolution techniques should be separated, including pronouncements on adjudication on the merits (e.g., summary judgement, trial by jury, and bench trial), settlements, and resolutions not on the merits (e.g., dismissals on venue or jurisdiction grounds, for pleading deficiencies, or as sanctions for litigation misconduct).
Within the settlement principles, distinctions should be drawn between wholly private settlements (no judicial involvement) and judicially facilitated settlements (e.g., via devices such as judicial settlement conferences, court-compelled arbitrations, and court-annexed mediations). Distinctions should be drawn between the various judicialfacilitation devices on questions like who may preside and whether only pleaded or otherwise presented claims may be considered. Further distinctions seem better addressed in civil procedure laws rather than in the judicial conduct standards. As well, distinctions should be drawn generally between settlements which may or may not prompt future same-case enforcement (e.g., where a settlement breach may be enforced in the very same case in which the settlement arose, thus obviating the need for a new civil action). Again, civil procedure laws seemingly would better speak to more particular issues.
Within the de novo principles involving adjudications on the merits, civil disputes might be distinguished between those involving only named parties, only pleaded or otherwise presented claims, or only nonparties (where some such disputes might only be settled, as they could never be tried on the merits). Within the de novo principles involving resolutions not on the merits, discretionary versus mandatory 211. FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 207 (1983) . KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 adjudicatory jurisdiction could generally be addressed, as well as full faith and credit/comity concerns.
C. New Civil Case Settlement Guidelines
With new visions of civil trial courts, new and more comprehensive written guidelines on civil case resolutions will be easier to promulgate. As to judicial settlement conferences in civil cases where there is some de novo authority over nonparties and unpleaded claims, 212 the Heileman issue (who may be compelled to attend a judicial settlement conference) could be solved by a new rule or statute, modeled on-though different from-Michigan Court Rule 2.401(F).
213 It could say:
For a conference at which meaningful discussion of settlement is anticipated, the court may direct that persons with authority to settle the pending claims, as well as representatives of lienholders, representatives of insurers, and others who are financially interested in the outcome of pending and related claims (1) be present at the conference or (2) be immediately available by telephone or otherwise.
214
As to both judicial settlement conferences and private settlement talks, on the requisites for a valid settlement agreement when there is possible same-case settlement enforcement, a new rule or statute, modeled on Texas Civil Procedure Rule 11, 215 could say: "No complete or partial settlement will be enforced unless it be in writing, signed, and allowed by the court to be filed, or CIV. R. 16 (speaking at greater length of the alternative dispute resolution methods involving voluntary facilitative mediation, early neutral evaluation, case evaluation, and court-annexed arbitration than of settlement conferences-though for the latter the role of an insurer is at least recognized). All court-sponsored settlement devices merit at least some guidance from written laws as they all can present difficult issues involving uniform practices.
215. TEX. R. CIV. P. 11. 216. Id.
to same-case enforcement. Here, the trial judges-unfortunatelybecome witnesses in the hearings over which they preside. While finding such an agreement potentially "enforceable," Judge Richard Posner opined, in Lynch, Inc. v. SamataMason Inc., 217 that reliance on the trial judge's memory of settlement details is a troublesome way to establish settlement terms because "memory is fallible" and "trial judges have a natural desire to see cases settled and off their docket." 218 A recording of the settlement by a court reporter, he said, would have provided a "solid, indeed an unimpeachable, basis" for establishing the agreement and constitutes "standard practice" that "should be followed in all cases." 219 In addressing when a trial court can enforce a settlement in the same civil case in which it arose, a California statute could also be used as a model. Following California Civil Procedure Code 664.6, a same-case judicial enforcement rule or statute could say:
If parties [or others legally interested in] pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed . . . outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested . . . the court may retain jurisdiction . . . to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.
220
In the federal district courts, where such enforcement typically would fall within the discretionary powers of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 221 jurisdiction to enforce can be "circumscribed by the terms" of the settlement). Thus, some complainants can seek settlement enforcement in the same trial courts if they seek compliance with settlement terms, but will need to initiate new cases where they urge the contracts are no longer valid (due to "material" breaches) or where they "seek general damages not specified" in the settlement agreements. Id. KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 how these discretionary powers might be exercised. There should be greater opportunities in federal courts for trial judges to agree to enforce settlements of pleaded claims involving named parties than settlements involving nonparties and state law claims. A new law could also reflect the mechanics of how a trial judge retains enforcement jurisdiction, as there has been confusion in the lower-level federal courts over the techniques available.
222
The foregoing illustrates only some of the possible new general civil procedure laws 223 on settlements that could follow a new vision of civil trial courts. 224 With a new vision of civil trial courts, additional guidelines might also be more easily pursued for nonsettlement issues involving nonparties and unpleaded claims over which there is currently some confusion. 225 For example, there is uncertainty concerning the type of hearing necessary when a plaintiff's insurer seeks to press a lien (arising from paid medical bills for example) against the monetary settlement recovered by the plaintiff in a tort case. A good example comes from Indiana where there is a lien reduction statute lacking detailed procedures. 226 As one state appeals court lamented:
The main problem in this case is the confusion on the part of both As to a defendant's insurer, there seems to be some uncertainty regarding the standards for notification of that insurer so that a plaintiff may recover later on a judgment entered against a defendant/insured.
228
Proper regard for nonparty interests and their participation opportunities in civil actions would be enhanced with a new written norm that said at the outset of a case, or at least by the time of serious settlement talks, that trial judges and adversaries should be informed as to "all persons, associations of persons, firms, partnerships, corporations, guarantors, insurers, affiliates, parent or subsidiary corporations, or other legal entities who or which are financially interested in the outcome of the case."
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D. New Trial Court Guidelines for Reviewing Private Arbitrations and Agency Adjudications
With a new vision of civil trial courts, it should also be easier to formulate better written guidelines for trial-court review of private arbitrations and agency adjudications.
These guidelines would supplement existing statutory provisions, as in federal and state arbitration and administrative procedure acts.
Concerning private arbitrations, the general guidelines on confirmation procedures typically should be comparable for arbitrations under general federal and state arbitration acts as the proarbitration policies are substantially similar. 230 While general statutes or court rules on proceedings to compel arbitration or to confirm an arbitration award are not plentiful, there are some existing laws that could serve as models in areas of uncertainty. 231 For example, there is some "alarm" over federal courts that too easily vacate arbitration awards 232 as well as some confusion about whether the FAA has a one-year statute of limitations for judicial confirmation proceedings. 233 On vacating arbitration awards, Iowa provisions seemingly speak more precisely than the FAA. 234 On timing, New York provisions seem clearer. 235 Moreover, there is unfortunately much confusion in the use of the term "arbitration agreement," rather than the more precise term "arbitration clause," in articulating judicial and arbitrator rules.
In February 2006, the Eleventh Circuit, while recognizing some confusion over the nonstatutory grounds for vacating FAA-guided arbitrations, 237 suggested there also be consideration of new, preferably written, guidelines on sanctioning those frivolously opposing final arbitration awards. Specifically, it said:
Courts cannot prevent parties from trying to convert arbitration losses into court victories, but it may be that we can and should insist that if a party on the short end of an arbitration award attacks that award in court without any real legal basis for doing so, that party should pay sanctions. A realistic threat of sanctions may discourage baseless litigation over arbitration awards and help fulfill the purposes of the pro-arbitration policy contained in the FAA. It is an idea worth considering.
238
It proceeded to declare itself "ready, willing, and able to consider imposing sanctions in appropriate cases," having issued a "notice and warning." 239 As with defenses in certain de novo civil actions, there may be an empirical, or other public policy, basis for treating specially, and with greater wariness, objections to certain arbitration confirmation proceedings.
In settings where there are superseding arbitration statutes, 240 as with health care 241 and employment, 242 special statutes or court rules on sanctioning those opposing arbitration confirmations may also be in order where the superseding statutes are silent. Again, while there are not special statutes or court rules at every turn, there are a few illustrations. For example, effective February 1, 2006, Pennsylvania has adopted new written court rules on compelling arbitration and confirming arbitration awards in consumer credit transactions. 243 to the particular agency lawmaking techniques that warrant even more deference (e.g., anything done procedurally beyond notice-and-comment rulemaking or bare bones informal adjudication). Amendments could also speak more generally to the attributes of lawmaking procedures that must be considered in determining whether greater deference is warranted. 252 As well, new written guidelines could be contemplated for the standards of federal judicial review applicable to agency determinations of factual issues during adjudications. For example, the federal Administrative Procedure Act provides, in its "scope of review" section, that an agency action not determined on the record be set aside if "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," 253 while an agency action determined on the record be set aside if "unsupported by substantial evidence." 254 While the congressional language seemingly suggests differing levels of scrutiny, many federal judges find "the substantial evidence test and the arbitrary or capricious test are one and the same." 255 Could new written norms help overcome the confusion?
Though there is good reason for state trial courts to operate like federal trial courts when reviewing final agency actions, 256 very different standards should sometimes apply. The comparable Illinois "scope of review" statute simply says that during judicial review of "any final administrative decision," the "findings and conclusions of the administrative agency on questions of fact shall be held to be prima facie true and correct."
257 While Illinois courts often use the federal court approach on deference to agency legal analysis, 258 on agency factfinding, Illinois precedents vary, speaking at times of a "manifest weight of the KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55
evidence" test 259 and at times of a "substantial evidence" test. 260 Reenvisioning American trial courts might help focus civil procedure lawmakers so that they clarify uncertain guidelines on judicial review of final administrative actions.
V. CONCLUSION
Today American trial courts are trying less, and managing more, private civil cases. They are also losing such cases to other dispute resolvers. The traditional role of the trial judge as chiefly a neutral, detached, and passive adjudicator for private civil cases has given way to the trial judge who is a more active case manager, a more aggressive settlement facilitator, and an appellate-type reviewer of case decisions made elsewhere. Unfortunately, contemporary-written civil procedure laws do not reflect this new vision. They increasingly reflect legend rather than reality. New general perspectives on contemporary trial court decisionmaking would help civil procedure lawmakers better formulate written procedural law guidelines for trial courts. In particular, there is a need for new written laws on trial court settlements as well as on trial court oversight of earlier private arbitrations and administrative agency actions. 
